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In this paper we study the determinants of citizens’ trust in the European Central Bank during 
the start-up phase from 1999-2004. Using a country panel based on the Eurobarometer survey, 
we find that higher inflation rates reduce trust. Thus people appear to evaluate the performance 
of the ECB on the basis of its success in achieving its primary objective, namely price 
stability. However, national income also has a strong impact, which poses a dilemma to the 
ECB, as it cannot increase economic growth in the long run. Unemployment does not have a 
significant impact on trust in the ECB, while unemployment spending exerts a trust-building 
impact. Possibly, automatic stabilizers serve as substitutes for ECB interventions, which would 
lower people’s trust. Interestingly, active labor market policies, which can be interpreted as 
proxies for the public’s perception of the urgency of the problem of high unemployment, tend 
to decrease trust. 
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1 Introduction 
When the Euro coins and banknotes were introduced in 2002 many citizens had the impression 
that it was accompanied by a jump in prices. Perceived inflation, which can be constructed 
from the European Commission’s Consumer Survey, showed a surge in this period (see ECB 
(2002) and ECB (2007)). These perceptions are puzzling, because Euro area-wide inflation, 
measured by the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), has been remarkably stable 
and low since the inception of the European Monetary Union. Interestingly, even five years 
after the Euro cash changeover, there is a striking discrepancy between perceived inflation and 
measured inflation (see ECB (2007)). This difference might indicate a pervasive lack of 
confidence and trust in the European Central Bank (ECB) and in its ability to keep inflation 
under control. 
Why is trust in the ECB as a political and economic institution important? First, the 
significance of reputation and credibility for the conduct of monetary policy is well-known 
since the pioneering works of Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983). In a 
similar vein, New Keynesian models imply that expectations about future inflation, which in 
turn are influenced by agents’ expectations about future monetary policy, play a key role in the 
determination of inflation.2 A high level of confidence in a central bank’s ability and 
determination to keep inflation at bay therefore enhances the effectiveness of monetary policy. 
By contrast, low levels of trust pose a problem for monetary policy makers. For example, 
disinflations are more costly when high inflation expectations manifest themselves in high 
nominal wage increases. 
Second and following from that, reduced functionality of the ECB through lower trust may 
reduce political support for the ECB, raising the demand for government control over 
monetary policy. Thus, ultimately, lower trust may endanger the ECB’s independence. Given 
2  See Clarida et al. (1999). 4
the commonly held view that central bank independence is a prerequisite for successful 
monetary policy, this should be worrying.3
Third, public support for the ECB may be an important determinant for the decision of non-
EMU members like Denmark, UK, and Sweden to join the Euro area.4 For example, in an 
atmosphere of nationwide dominating EU-criticism, Denmark has refused to adopt the Euro, 
following a referendum in 2000. 
This leads us to the question of what determines people’s confidence in the ECB, which this 
paper aims to test empirically in a panel for Euro zone countries with data from the 
Eurobarometer survey, from 1999 to 2004.5 According to the Maastricht treaty, guaranteeing 
price stability is the ECB’s paramount objective. Thus, it is plausible that inflation and 
changes therein affect trust in the ECB. However, as there may be a connection between 
monetary policy and economic performance, at least in the short run, or from an ordinary 
economically inexperienced person’s viewpoint, we also test the impact of national income 
and unemployment. Finally, we investigate the effects of labor market policies and economic 
stabilizers, which might equally correlate with economic performance.
We find that, in line with our expectations, higher inflation lowers confidence in the ECB. 
Moreover, national income appears conducive, while unemployment does not exert any 
significant impact. Finally, more active labor market policies, possible serving as a signal of 
the state of the economy, lower trust, while unemployment spending increases it, possibly 
substituting for trust destroying ECB interventions.
3  For a formal analysis of the delegation of monetary policy to a conservative central banker, compare the 
seminal article by Rogoff (1985). For a more recent contribution see Herrendorf and Lockwood (1997). 
Among others, Alesina (1989) has found empirical support for the hypothesis that central bank 
independence is beneficial. 
4  Formally, only UK and Denmark have a right to decide whether or not to adopt the Euro. However, the 
example of Sweden shows that a country can deliberately remain outside the EMU by violating the 
membership criteria.
5   Using data from the Eurobarometer survey, Hudson (2006) examines the determinants of trust for various 
institutions and the relationship between institutional trust and individual well-being. However, his focus 
is not on the ECB and he does not consider inflation and GDP, which we find are major factors 
influencing people’s trust in the ECB.5
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 develops our hypotheses, while 
section 3 describes the data and introduces the methodology. The findings are presented and 
discussed in section 4. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
2 Factors that are Likely to Influence the Trust in the ECB 
We have already mentioned that maintaining price stability is the ECB’s main objective. It is 
therefore plausible that the public’s trust in the ECB depends on how successful the ECB is in 
this respect. While the ECB aims at stabilizing HICP inflation aggregated over the entire 
EMU, there have been substantial differences in national inflation rates. In September 2007, 
for example, the 12-month average inflation rate amounted to 1.4% in Finland and France and 
2.9% in Greece.6 It is likely that citizens’ confidence in the ECB is affected by national 
inflation rates rather than EMU aggregates. We would surmise that higher inflation leads to a 
lower level of trust. 
Many central banks also have other objectives, in addition to the goal of maintaining price-
stability. For example, one of the Federal Reserve's additional goals is maximum employment. 
That most central banks are often also made accountable for employment and output is 
reflected by the standard central bank's loss function that is used in many macroeconomic 
models. This loss function captures a trade-off between two goals, namely price-stability and 
employment.7 There is another reason to believe that the public might hold the ECB 
accountable for high levels of unemployment and low growth. In particular, politicians 
sometimes accuse the ECB of pursuing an excessively tight monetary policy that is 
detrimental to their national economy. For example, the French President Sarkozy demanded 
that the ECB adopt looser monetary policy in order to boost French exports.8 To sum up, 
although the Maastricht treaty assigns only a subordinate role to other targets than price 
6  See http://europa.eu.int/rapid.
7  Compare Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983).
8   “The Economist”, July 10th 2007, “Nicolas Sarkozy wants a bigger budget deficit”.6
stability, we conjecture that citizens make the ECB equally responsible for other key economic 
variables like the unemployment rate and GDP growth. Again, we assume that citizens are 
more concerned (and better informed) about national variables than about EMU-wide 
aggregates. Obviously, one would expect that high levels of unemployment and GDP growth 
reduce the public’s confidence in the ECB.9 
Closely related to a country’s economic performance and changes therein are national 
governments’ responses to it, such as subsidies for the unemployed and expenses for programs 
that aim at re-integrating jobless persons into the employed population. More specifically, 
since it is difficult for an ordinary citizen to judge when the current state of economy should 
be of a major concern or not, such government activities as reactions to economic changes 
may serve as signal of the seriousness of the situation. For this reason, we also conjecture that 
spending on unemployment benefits and expenses for so-called active labor market policies 
may affect confidence in the ECB.
3 Data and Methodology
Data
Trust in the ECB is obtained from various Eurobarometer surveys between 1999, the first year 
trust in the ECB was assessed, and 2004, the last year the survey was available.10 We measure 
the national level of trust in the ECB as the share of respondents in the national sample 
answering “yes, tend to” to the question “And, for each of them, please tell me if you tend to 
trust it or tend not to trust it? (READ OUT): ‘The European Central Bank’”. The possible 
answers were “1, Tend to trust”, “2, Tend not to trust”, and “3, Don’t know”. With 12 countries 
constituting the Eurozone observed for 5 years since the establishment of the ECB and the 
9   Transparency may also have an impact on trust in the ECB. Using a Dutch household survey, van der 
Cruijsen and Eijffinger (2008) find that respondents with higher transparency perceptions are likely to 
have more trust in the ECB.
10   On average, there were four Eurobarometer rounds per year covering differing topics. If the question of 
interest was posed twice within the same year, we employed an unweighted average of the round-specific 
population shares. We calculated round-specific population shares using cross-sectional individual weights 
supplied by the Eurobarometer surveys. 7
introduction of the Euro as a fixed exchange rate regime, we obtain a balanced panel of 72 
data points.11 
Macroeconomic variables are obtained from the Word Development Indicators database (WDI 
2007), the EUROSTAT, and the OECD. These include GDP per capita (measured in PPP 
constant 2000 int'l US$) and population size for the baseline model. Furthermore, we also 
employ the national inflation rate (measured by the CPI and the HCPI), the unemployment 
rate, and government spending on unemployment benefits as well as on active labor market 
policies, measured as shares of GDP. Table A1 of the Appendix provides descriptive 
statistics.12 
The development of people’s trust in the ECB, expressed in percentage of the total population, 
from the years 1999 to 2004 is illustrated in Graphs 1 to 3. In general, three types of 
development can be roughly distinguished: a deterioration of people’s trust in the ECB over 
time is observable for the Netherlands, France, and Ireland (Graph 1). In contrast, an upward 
trend, indicating that the population gained confidence in the ECB, is observable for Finland, 
Greece, Luxembourg, and Italy, as Graph 2 illustrates. Graph 3 depicts the percentages of the 
trusting population for the remaining countries Austria, Belgium, Germany, Portugal, and 
Spain. For these countries, no clear trend is observable – rather, the time series appear 
somewhat stationary with values fluctuating around some constant mean.13 
----------------------------------------------
Insert Graphs 1, 2 and 3 about here
----------------------------------------------
11   In principle, we could have calculated the share of yes-sayers in responding population, neglecting those 
who chose not to answer the trust question. However, although the correlation coefficient between these 
two alternative definitions exceeds 0.9 in each single wave, the share of confident residents has, by 
definition, to be expressed in terms of total population. 
12   Most of these variables are employed in their logarithmic form. The sole exception pertains to the various 
inflation indices. 
13   A graph displaying the time series for all 12 Eurozone countries jointly is presented in the Appendix. 8
Model
For this analysis, we view people’s trust in the European Central Bank in EMU-member 
country i at time t ( ) as a function of the macroeconomic state of the participants’ economies 
( ). The macroeconomic state is proxied by various measures relating to GDP, inflation 
and unemployment, as described in the previous section. Since it may take some time until a 
country’s population becomes fully aware of changes in its economy’s state, most of the 
objective economic variables enter the model lagged by one period. 
As both the actual and the perceived state of the economy and trust in the ECB might be 
correlated with other basic national characteristics of the country ( ), we also control for 
population size, which may, for example, reflect the size of the domestic market.
 
Unobserved individual heterogeneity due to e.g. national differences in mentality, history, and 
national institutions is taken account by employing country fixed effects ( ). Moreover, year 
fixed effects ( ) proxy characteristics in the environment that are identical for all countries in 
the sample, but change on an annual basis, such as e.g. the Euro cash changeover, EU 
enlargements, and the state of the world economy. Finally, an individual-specific error term 
( it) complements the model. Given the nature of our dependent variable, which is measured in 
continuous percentage points, we apply a fixed effects GLS estimator.
Our empirical approach is to start with a very simple baseline specification, and to investigate 
the impact of further economic determinants via step-by-step model extensions. The first 
analysis deals with the effect of national income, followed by an investigation into the role of 
inflation, while the last two analyses relate to the effects of unemployment and labor market 
policies. 9
4 Trust in the ECB, 1999 – 2004
The influence of national income
The results for the effects of national income, measured by GDP per capita, for trust in the 
ECB are reported in Table 1. As regards our baseline variables, which we include in all models 
further on, there is a tendency that more populous countries are less trusting in the European 
Central Bank. 
Our variable of interest in this analysis, national income of the past period, appears strongly 
positively correlated with a population’s trust in the ECB, statistically significant at the 1 
percent level. Comparable results are obtained when using the two-period lagged GDP. The 
similar coefficient sizes and equal significance levels suggest that national income two years 
ago is of comparable importance for trust in the ECB compared to when employing the one-
period lagged value.14 Alternatively, due to the extremely high correlation of GDP over time 
(with an autocorrelation coefficient of 0.99) the two-period lag might just proxy the one-
period lagged value. Unfortunately, this strong correlation prevents simultaneous inclusion in 
the same model. Overall, the results in columns 1 and 2 indicate that between 1999 and 2004 
wealthier countries had more confidence in the ECB.
The influences of GDP growth are analyzed in columns 3 and 4, with our variable of interest 
added to the baseline model consisting of population size, country and time fixed effects. The 
model in column 3 employs current GDP growth defined as the change between actual GDP 
and past GDP, divided by past GDP, while column 4 uses the GDP growth rate lagged by one 
period. Both estimates for either measure are insignificant, suggesting that GDP growth has no 
effect for a nation’s trust in the ECB.15 However, these results might well be driven by the fact 
that we compare unconditional GDP growth across countries.  
14   A Wald-test across models 1 and 2 does not reject the hypothesis of equality of coefficients ( 2(1) = 2.02 
with p-value = 0.1552).
15   Please note the change in sign between column 3 and 4, with only the latter being in line with our 
predictions. 10
More specifically, classical macroeconomic models of growth imply that poorer countries 
grow faster than richer countries. Hence, we can expect the effect of GDP growth be assessed 
differently by the population, depending on the economic stage a country is currently in. More 
specifically, a moderate growth rate is most likely to be judged unfavorably if the country is at 
the beginning of its economic development, while the same rate may be highly appreciated in 
a prosperous economy. The estimations in columns 5 and 6 take account of path dependency 
and conditional effects by simultaneously employing the past level of GDP and GDP growth 
rates in the same model. While model 5 combines current growth with the lagged GDP level, 
model 6 employs the same set of GDP variables, but all lagged by one additional period. 
Both models 5 and 6 suggest that national richness is an important trust-building device, 
independent of the number of lags. (However, again, past values may well only approximate 
current values, with the structure of the data not permitting us to disentangle both effects). 
Contrasting results are obtained for GDP growth. While current economic growth does not 
appear to influence the confidence in the ECB, past year’s growth appears highly conducive to 
it (significance at the 1 percent level).16 In line with our prediction, higher growth rates 
contribute positively to a nation’s trust in the ECB. Thus, as model 6 suggests, both national 
income as well as increases therein appear to trigger more trust. 
However, a statistical test based on a more simple specification (using only past GDP levels 
( ) and changes therein ( ) cannot reject the hypothesis of equality of 
coefficients of both variables.17 Thus, one might conclude that both variables jointly represent 
only the effect of GDP in period t-1 (as  ). On the other 
hand, the fact that both levels of national income and changes therein are independently 
significant determinants of trust supports the interpretation that both exert an impact of their 
own. For simplicity, from now on we will account for the positive effects of national income 
and its growth rate on trust in the ECB by using the one-period lagged GDP level. 
16   Estimating a model with both current and past GDP growth, which are only moderately correlated (  = 
0.49), yields qualitatively identical results, with only past GDP level and growth exerting significant 
impacts.
17   The null hypothesis is not rejected with prob. = 0.89 (F(1, 52) = 0.02). 11
To sum up, we find a robust trust-enhancing effect of GDP per capita and its growth rate. One 
possible interpretation is that people hold the ECB accountable for the general economic 
development, despite the fact that influencing economic growth is only one of its subordinate 
objectives. However, it is equally conceivable that growing wealth leads to more trust in a 
country’s political and economic institution in general, generating positive spill-overs for 
European institutions.
----------------------------------------
Insert Table 1 about here
----------------------------------------
The effects of inflation and unemployment
Table 2 investigates the impact of inflation and unemployment on trust in the ECB for the 
Eurozone countries. Allowing for non-linearity in the effects of inflation, we employ not only 
the simple inflation rate, but also its squared term. In the first model we add the current 
inflation rate, while in model 2 the lagged inflation rate is employed. Model 3 then employs 
both current and lagged values. The results show clearly that it is the current inflation rather 
than the one of the last year that matters to people’s trust in the ECB (columns 1 and 2). This 
finding is corroborated by the estimates of model 3, although decreases in significances are 
observable for all inflation variables likewise. The results for model 1 also show that the 
marginal effect of current inflation on trust is slightly decreasing. Thus, in line with our 
predictions, the performance of the ECB with respect to its major goal, namely maintaining 
price stability, matters to people’s confidence in this institution.  
Models in columns 4 through 7 analyze the effects of unemployment (and changes therein), 
also controlling for current inflation. In all models, as observed before, rising inflation appears 
to lower trust in the ECB. Columns 4 and 5 report the results for the current and the lagged 
changes in unemployment rates. The estimates show that, in contrast to expectations, a change 
in unemployment is not significantly associated with confidence in the ECB. 12
In contrast, turning to the effects of the level of unemployment (column 6), we find that more 
unemployment in the past period exerts a positive influence on trust, contradicting our 
expectations.18 
However, people’s assessment of a change in the unemployment rate might be different when 
conditioned on the initial level of unemployment in the economy. For example, an increase by 
2 percentage points may be viewed as detrimental in an economy that was used to extremely 
low unemployment rates of 2%, potentially mirroring a doubling of the absolute number of 
unemployed. In contrast, an economy with already 20% of jobless persons might not be 
concerned about a 2 percentage point increase, resulting in a relative change of only 10%.  
Model 7 takes this into account by combining models 5 and 6, considering the levels and 
changes in the unemployment rate simultaneously. The estimates show that only the level 
exerts a significant impact, but not its change.19
Overall, the analyses of this section support our prediction that higher inflation is destructive 
to people’s trust in the ECB, reflecting their satisfaction with ECB’s performance regarding 
her main task. In contrast, changes in unemployment are not associated with people’s trust, 
potentially reflecting that the population does not hold the ECB responsible for this aspect of 
the state of the national economy. More astonishing is the finding that higher levels of 
unemployment appear beneficial to trust, contradicting our expectations. We will return to this 
paradoxical point in the next section. 
----------------------------------------
Insert Table 2 about here
----------------------------------------
The effects of labor market policies
Because of the counter-intuitive finding that higher levels of unemployment are associated 
with more trust it is worthwhile to investigate this point in more detail. Table 3 reports the 
18   A qualitatively identical result is obtained for present values of unemployment rates. 
19   These results prevail when our variables of interest are lagged by one additional period. 13
results for the models in which two government spending variables have been added: first, 
unemployment benefits spending, measured as share of GDP, which is automatically triggered 
by rising unemployment rates. Second, they also test the effects of active labor market policy 
spending, such as spending on training and re-employment programs, the level of which is 
usually at the discretion of the ruling governments. Put differently, while unemployment 
spending works as an automatic stabilizer, active labor market policy spending constitutes a 
means of deliberate policy-making. 
The baseline model results (based on a specification obtained from the previous section) are 
reported in column 1, with a significant negative impact of inflation and a positive impact of 
unemployment. Model 2 adds lagged government unemployment spending to the new 
baseline, while model 3 includes lagged spending on active labor market policies. Both labor 
market policy variables are simultaneously tested in Model 4.
The results for model 2 reveal that neither unemployment spending nor the unemployment rate 
affect trust in the ECB significantly, at least not in this model specification. However, the 
coefficient on unemployment spending is only slightly below the 10 percent level of 
significance, while the one on unemployment rate is far below conventional significance 
levels. The most important conclusion from these findings is that the previously observed 
positive impact of the unemployment rate was driven by (unobserved) unemployment 
spending, which it must have approximated.  
In contrast, the estimates of model 3 clearly indicate that more active labor market spending 
triggers lower levels of trust in the ECB, for any given unemployment rate. Possibly, a 
government’s stronger engagement in such policies might serve as a signal to the citizenry that 
contemporary unemployment rates are of serious concern, possibly combined with a not so 
rosy outlook of the overall economic development. Moreover, higher spending on active labor 
market policies might also be a political manifestation of the voters’ growing concern about 
high unemployment. Note also that unemployment rates themselves are still positively 
associated with trust in the ECB, suggesting that these are not approximated by active labor 
market spending, which, thus, does not appear to serve as automatic stabilizer. 14
Finally, when employing both labor market variables (model 4), we find that either type of 
government spending matters for people’s trust in the ECB, with a significance at least at the 5 
percent level. Qualitatively, the results are identical compared to those of the previous two 
models, with a trust decreasing impact of active labor market policies and a trust increasing 
effect of unemployment spending. Please note that the unemployment rate itself does not 
influence trust in the ECB any more. 
Why is there a positive impact of unemployment spending on trust in the ECB? A first guess 
would be that higher unemployment rates and, thus, higher unemployment spending serve as 
signals for a deteriorating or bad economic state – for which the ECB may be to blame. Thus, 
one would rather expect a negative effect of unemployment benefit spending. However, an 
alternative and opposing prediction is based on a substitute relation between national and 
European institutions, in particular, between the national parliament and the ECB, in their 
guiding national economies. More specifically, strong national economic stabilizers, for 
example a generous unemployment insurance, may mitigate the adverse effects of a bad 
economic state, thus lowering political pressure on the ECB to intervene. As both political 
pressure and possible interventions induced by this pressure may be detrimental to trust, 
automatic stabilizers may be conducive to trust in the ECB.20 Based on these arguments, it is 
not entirely implausible that we observe a positive relation between an automatic national 
stabilizer and this country’s confidence in the ECB.  
----------------------------------------
Insert Table 3 about here
----------------------------------------
Extension: The influence of increases in the prices of non-durable goods 
It is often argued that it is ‘felt’ rather than ‘actual’ inflation that matters to people’s 
assessment of the state of the economy. In particular, as ECB (2007) argues, consumers may 
20 We conjecture that people assess an ECB intervention to stabilize the real economy negatively, because, for 
example, it may serve as a negative signal on the economy’s state or might be viewed as a general failure of this 
institution’s policy-making. As support for this claim, please note the media response to the Fed’s intervention as 
reaction to the US financial market and bank crisis in spring 2008.15
pay closer attention to the prices of those goods they are frequently confronted with and are 
less attentive with respect to some other prices. In consequence, we conjecture that 
consumers’ trust in the ECB is likely to be influenced in particular by the price developments 
for typical non-durable goods and services such as fuel (mobility and heating), food, and 
goods and services for routine household maintenance. Therefore one might expect that the 
previously observed effect of the all-items CPI is driven by the impact of price increases in 
non-durable goods.
In Table 4, we analyze whether the price changes for these goods dominate the effects of 
overall-inflation by including the inflation rates for these subindices in addition to CPI 
inflation, based on the baseline specification displayed in column 1.21 The impact of the CPI 
inflation remains negative, with coefficient sizes appearing more or less equal across models, 
although significance levels appear slightly changed. Interestingly, there is no significant 
influence of the subindices’ inflation rates for models 2-4. 
To draw a conclusion, we find no empirical evidence for the hypothesis that the trust-lowering 
effect of overall price level is driven by prices for non-durable goods that are paid on a 
frequent basis by households.
----------------------------------------
Insert Table 4 about here
----------------------------------------
Robustness tests: trust in national institutions, long-term growth, knowledge on the EU and 
subjective expectations on economic development
To challenge our findings, it might be argued that the average person does not differentiate 
between European and national institutions when she develops her confidence in such 
governance structures. In the perception of the average citizen, national organs of governance 
21   For simplicity, we have assumed a linear functional form of inflation. However, the results are 
qualitatively identical when we allow for non-linearities. 16
might well appear to dominate the decision-making process in the political realms and, thus, 
economic policy outcomes like national income, unemployment and inflation. For this reason, 
the effects observed for the ECB might actually constitute spill-overs of the determinants of 
trust in the national organs. In other words, trust in the ECB would be a mere proxy for trust in 
the national government or the national parliament. Similarly, one might surmise that citizens 
do not distinguish between different EU institutions; then trust in the ECB may approximate 
trust in the EU in general. 
Table 5 tests these conjectures for trust in the national government, national parliament and the 
European Union as a whole. The measures of trust are constructed in the identical way as 
those for the ECB, using the Eurobarometer waves during the period of investigation, 1999 – 
2004.22 We estimate the determinants of trust using the regression model of Table 2, column 1, 
and that of Table 3, column 4. The first model focuses on the impact of inflation, while the 
second analyzes the effect of labor market policies. In contrast to the corresponding regression 
outcomes for the ECB, confidence in the national government, the national parliament and the 
European Union do not appear to be influenced by the state of the macroeconomy – at least 
during the rather short period under investigation. Thus, trust in the ECB does not appear as a 
side-product of trust in national governing bodies. 
----------------------------------------
Insert Table5 about here
----------------------------------------
However, if citizens held the national bodies responsible for the economic state in their 
country, trust in national institutions might mediate the influence of the national economy for 
trust in the ECB. A similar argument applies to trust in the EU as a whole, which might 
equally mediate the effects of labor market policies for trust in the ECB. Table 6 analyzes the 
potential transmission channel function exerted by trust in different institutions of governance. 
Thus we add these vertical trust variables to the baseline model of Table 3, column 4. Not 
22   Trust is measured as the weighted share of the interviewees reporting ‚tend to trust’. The questions on trust 
in the national government and the EU are missing for the year 2000. For the years 2001 and 2004, the 
trust questions have been posed twice. For these years we employ a yearly average. 17
surprisingly, trust in the various institutions is positively correlated with trust in the ECB 
(columns 1, 2, and 3).23 Nevertheless, in all four regressions our labor market spending 
variables remain significant and keep their previously observed direction of influence. We 
conclude that trust in national or supranational institutions of governance do not mediate the 
effects of the macroeconomic factor for trust in the ECB. 
----------------------------------------
Insert Table 6 about here
----------------------------------------
Our model might be misspecified because of the omission of long-term growth rates. Table 7 
tests this conjecture by inclusion of the 5-year, 10-year and 20-year growth rates to the 
regression model that consists only of the current GDP growth rate and population size (Table 
1, column 3).24 Column 1 of Table 7 suggests that both current and 10-year growth rates are 
determinants of trust in the ECB, a finding that is corroborated for the 10-year growth rate 
only when it is separately included (columns 2 and 3). However, columns 4 through 6 clearly 
show that there is no economic growth effect for trust in the ECB when the level of national 
income is accounted for in the specification. In column 6, the four growth coefficients are not 
only independently, but also jointly insignificant (F(4, 49) = 0.68; Prob > F = 0.6072). Like 
Table 1, Table 6 shows that short-term and long-term growth effects are either non-existent or 
captured by the national income effect. Indeed, the correlation coefficient of long-term 20-year 
growth rates with current per capita income is 0.6142. Thus, our results are insensitive to 
variations in the time span covered by economic growth.
----------------------------------------
Insert Table 7 about here
23   The among the two trust variables relating to national organs is 0.93 in our sample. In column 4, they are 
both jointly insignificant. It appears consistent that only influence in the EU exerts an influence on trust in 
the ECB. For the effects of political trust on the United Nations, see Torgler (2007). 
24   The simple correlations of the four growth variables range from 0.42 up to 0.89 which allows their joint 
inclusion in the model.  18
----------------------------------------
It might also be argued that the effect of macroeconomic conditions of an economy for a 
citizen’s trust in the ECB depends on her knowledge on the European Union and its 
institutions. To test this conjecture we employ the share of those in the population who report 
themselves as highly knowledgeable on the EU, reaching the highest categories from 8 to 10 
out of 10. Interaction effects between this variable and macroeconomic variables should yield 
significant coefficients in case of a knowledge dependency of the macroeconomic conditions. 
Table 8 provides the results of this exercise. In both columns 1 and 2, the share of informed 
persons is simply added to the two baseline models (obtained from Table 2, column 1, and 
Table 3, column 4, respectively), but turn out insignificant. Columns 3, 4 and 6 show that there 
is no significant interaction between the share of well informed and inflation, national income 
or active labor market policies when it comes to trusting the ECB.25 In contrast, the effects of 
unemployment spending interact negatively with the share of informed population (column 5), 
counterweighting the positive impact of unemployment spending per se. Thus, for a more 
informed population the positive effect of unemployment spending is reduced, and the total 
effect might even reach zero for the maximum share of knowledgeable persons (maximum: .
157 = 15.7% in the sample). Given that we interpreted the positive effect of unemployment 
spending as a proxy for lower political pressure on the ECB to intervene, better information on 
the EU might well reduce the call for ECB interventions in the face of a bad economic state. 
However, for most of the nations and time periods in our sample the net impact of 
unemployment spending remains positive, only reduced in size. Even though information on 
the EU reduces the bias in column 5, we should however note that the negative impact of 
inflation and that of active labor market policy spending well prevail. Overall, even when 
taking into account the role of information on the EU in our model, all main findings of our 
previous analyses still hold.
----------------------------------------
25   In column 6, all three variables are jointly highly significant (F(3, 46) = 4.28, p-value = 0.0096), but pair-
wise tests of joint significance suggest that the interaction term should be omitted from the model 
specification. 19
Insert Table 8 about here
----------------------------------------
Finally, we have tested the hypothesis that expectations on the economic development might 
influence trust in the ECB, and also partly mediate the effects of the macroeconomic factors in 
our model, particularly in case these factors serve as basis for the formation of such 
expectations. In particular, we separately include the share of those in the population who 
expect a worsening of the overall economy, their financial household situation, the general 
employment situation in the economy and their personal job situation.26 Unfortunately, no 
information on inflation expectations was available. Column 1 of Table 9 presents the results 
for the baseline model. Not surprisingly, having a gloomy view on the economy, the labor 
market or on one’s own economic state is negatively correlated with trust in the ECB (columns 
2 - 5). Striking is, however, that most coefficients on the macroeconomic indicators 
unemployment spending, active labor market policy spending and national income remain 
unaffected in their magnitude. The sole exception pertains to the impact of active labor market 
policy spending, that appears reduced when controlling for pessimistic expectations on the 
whole economy, which is not the case when a ‘bad general employment situation’ is expected. 
This finding is in line with our previous interpretation that a stronger engagement in active 
labor market policy spending is viewed as a signal of the general state of the economy rather 
than a sector-specific indicator. 
----------------------------------------
Insert Table 9 about here
----------------------------------------
26   Calculated as share of respondents who assess the specific expected economic situation as ‘worse’. 
Alternative possible answers are ‘better’ and ‘the same’. 20
5 Conclusions
In this paper we have analyzed which factors determine the trust of EMU citizens in the 
European Central Bank. Because the European Central Bank’s primary objective amounts to 
price stability, it is plausible that the inflation rate is a major determinant of trust. We confirm 
this presumption, as the inflation rate always has a significantly negative impact. 
One might equally conjecture that people make the ECB responsible for the general state of 
the economy, as it is reflected by unemployment and output. However, the unemployment rate 
or changes therein do not affect trust in the ECB, while confidence in this institution 
significantly benefits from higher national income. Active labor market policies, which may 
serve as a proxy for the perceived severity of the unemployment problem and signal for the 
general state of the economy, are associated with lower levels of trust. In contrast, government 
spending on unemployment benefits appears as trust-building device, potentially because it 
lowers the need for an ECB intervention policy. 
It is important to stress that our empirical analysis concerns the startup phase of the EMU. 
This period is particularly interesting, because trust in the ECB is likely to be more sensitive to 
changes in the economic environment compared to later periods. Indeed, it seems plausible 
that people’s attention to the single European currency will diminish over time. Then trust in 
the ECB can be expected to be less dependent on current economic variables but rather on the 
national economy’s long-run performance.
This finding represents a dilemma for the ECB. Obviously, trust in the ECB is to a large part 
attributable to national policies which the ECB cannot influence. More specifically, while the 
ECB’s success in achieving price stability actually has a beneficial effect on trust, other 
important macroeconomic factors like national income, labor market policies and the welfare 
state equally have a substantial effect on its perception by citizens. However, the ECB has no 
means to influence these latter factors in the long-run, since only national governments could 
contribute to higher economic growth. According to our findings, embarking on growth-
enhancing reforms might ultimately lead to a more favorable public assessment not only of 
national political institutions, but also of the ECB. However, we also find some support for a 
trust-enhancing role of automatic stabilizers. 2122
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Appendix
Table A1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Max
trust 72 52 8 35 76
population 72 2530754 2627842 42150 8250794
Population (log) 72 1634 141 1295 1823
GDP per capita 72 2742273 949145 1592759 6164115
GDP (log) 72 1017 29 968 1103
GDP growth rates 72 3 3 -2 16
Unemployment rate 72 750 355 180 1860
Unemployment rate (log) 72 189 53 59 292
Change in (log of) unemployment rate 72 110 198 0 1156
Spending on active labor market policies (% GDP) 72 80 37 20 140
Spending on active labor market policies (log) 72 -37 61 -161 34
Spending on unemployment benefits (%GDP) 72 136 79 40 330
Spending on unemployment benefits (log) 72 13 64 -92 119
inflation 72 239 105 19 557
food 72 265 182 -260 700
household maintenance 72 141 199 -700 710
fuels 72 544 880 -690 3160
year 72 200150 172 1999 2004
Notes: Except for the inflation-related variables and the trust variable, values are lagged by on period. 25
Graph A226
Tables
Table 1: The influence of GDP
1 2 3 4 5 6
GDP (lagged) 0.853** 0.890**
[4.89] [4.66]
GDP (lagged by 2 ) 0.705** 0.871**
[3.64] [4.60]
GDP growth  -411 156
[1.20] [0.50]
GDP growth (lagged) 418 0.788**
[1.39] [2.93]
population (lagged) -2.826** -2.824** -612 235 -2.738** -2.904**
[3.34] [2.78] [0.70] [0.30] [3.15] [3.06]
Constant 38.041** 39.535* 10552 -331 36.230** 39.139**
[2.99] [2.60] [0.74] [0.26] [2.72] [2.75]
Observations 72 72 72 72 72 72
Number of id 12 12 12 12 12 12
R-squared 45 36 22 23 45 45
Notes: Dependent variable is percentage of population expressing trust in the ECB. GLS fixed effects estimation. 
Year effects are included but not reported. ‘+’, ‘*’, ‘**’ denote significant at the 10, 5, or 1 percent levels, 
respectively. 27
Table 2: The effects of inflation and unemployment
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
inflation -0.035+ -34 -0.035+ -0.038+ -0.036+ -0.036+
[1.73] [1.36] [1.70] [1.85] [1.84] [1.82]
infl. squared 4 4 4 4 5 5
[1.19] [1.01] [1.18] [1.29] [1.42] [1.40]
infl. (lagged) -7 1
[0.28] [0.33]
infl. squared (lagged) -1 -3
[0.36] [0.69]
  unemployment -23 -11
[0.44] [0.22]
  unempl. (lagged) -44
[0.88]
unempl. (lagged) 0.083* 0.082*
[2.10] [2.05]
unempl. (lagged by 2)
GDP (lagged) 0.873** 0.864** 0.879** 0.868** 0.824** 0.941** 0.938**
[5.05] [4.97] [5.04] [4.96] [4.52] [5.52] [5.42]
population (lagged) -2.761** -2.552** -2.621** -2.634** -2.335* -2.729** -2.668**
[3.23] [2.96] [2.99] [2.90] [2.37] [3.30] [3.03]
Constant 36.811** 33.439* 34.458* 34.773* 30.343* 35.420** 34.451*
[2.86] [2.57] [2.61] [2.53] [2.04] [2.84] [2.58]
Observations 72 72 72 72 72 72 72
Number of id 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
R-squared 49 48 5 49 49 53 53
Notes: Dependent variable is percentage of population expressing trust in the ECB. GLS fixed effects estimation. 
Year effects are included but not reported. ‘+’, ‘*’, ‘**’ denote significant at the 10, 5, or 1 percent levels, 
respectively. 28
Table 3: The effects of labor market policies
1 2 3 4
unempl. spending (lagged) 65 0.083*
[1.58] [2.18]
labor market policies spending (lagged) -0.105** -0.117**
[2.80] [3.20]
unemployment (lagged) 0.083* 41 0.122** 72
[2.10] [0.87] [3.07] [1.63]
inflation -0.036+ -0.039+ -26 -29
[1.84] [2.01] [1.38] [1.56]
infl. squared 5 5 3 3
[1.42] [1.48] [0.97] [1.01]
GDP (lagged) 0.941** 0.941** 0.992** 0.998**
[5.52] [5.60] [6.16] [6.43]
population (lagged) -2.729** -3.112** -3.078** -3.610**
[3.30] [3.66] [3.92] [4.54]
Constant 35.420** 41.759** 40.476** 49.188**
[2.84] [3.23] [3.42] [4.07]
Observations 72 72 72 72
Number of id 12 12 12 12
R-squared 53 55 59 63
Notes: Dependent variable is percentage of population expressing trust in the ECB. GLS fixed effects estimation. 
Year effects are included but not reported. ‘+’, ‘*’, ‘**’ denote significant at the 10, 5, or 1 percent levels, 
respectively. 29
Table 4: The effects of inflation of non-durable goods 
1 2 3 4
inflation -0.014+ -13 -0.019* -13
[1.85] [1.19] [2.23] [1.62]
labor market policies spending (lagged) -0.111** -0.108** -0.119** -0.112**
[3.11] [2.86] [3.31] [3.09]
unempl. spending (lagged) 0.115** 0.117** 0.114** 0.114**
[3.44] [3.38] [3.44] [3.39]
population (lagged) -3.938** -3.941** -3.694** -3.902**
[5.03] [4.98] [4.60] [4.88]
GDP (lagged) 0.960** 0.955** 0.940** 0.954**
[6.20] [6.03] [6.07] [6.05]
inflation (food) -1
[0.23]




Constant 55.092** 55.169** 51.308** 54.560**
[4.67] [4.63] [4.23] [4.54]
Observations 72 72 72 72
Number of id 12 12 12 12
R-squared 6 6 61 6
Notes: Dependent variable is percentage of population expressing trust in the ECB. GLS fixed effects estimation. 
Year effects are included but not reported. ‘+’, ‘*’, ‘**’ denote significant at the 10, 5, or 1 percent levels, 
respectively. 30
Table 5: Trust in national Government, national Parliament, and in the European Union
1 2 3 4 5 6
Trust in the national 
Government
Trust in the national 
Parliament
Trust in the EU
unempl. spending (lagged) 42 -14 -22
[0.58] [0.25] [0.52]
labor market policies spending 
(lagged) 26 -49 -47
[0.37] [0.93] [1.14]
unemployment (lagged) -107 -21 35
[1.28] [0.32] [0.70]
inflation 2 14 39 42 6 13
[0.49] [0.33] [1.31] [1.37] [0.26] [0.53]
infl. squared -1 -1 -3 -4 0 -1
[0.11] [0.11] [0.65] [0.78] [0.08] [0.16]
population (lagged) -1199 -1496 -279 -436 -177 -141
[0.85] [0.98] [0.26] [0.37] [0.21] [0.15]
GDP (lagged) 462 421 19 186 27 277
[1.58] [1.40] [0.85] [0.81] [1.54] [1.54]
Constant 15346 20837 3061 5683 665 -99
[0.72] [0.90] [0.19] [0.32] [0.05] [0.01]
Observations 59 59 71 71 59 59
Number of id 12 12 12 12 12 12
R-squared 45 47 42 44 65 67
F-test 4398 1584 19463 17134 3164 4334
p-value 65 85 15 19 73 65
Notes: Dependent variable is percentage of population expressing trust in the national Government, parliament or 
in the European Union, respectively. GLS fixed effects estimation. Year effects are included but not reported. ‘+’, 
‘*’, ‘**’ denote significant at the 10, 5, or 1 percent levels, respectively. 31
Table 6: Trust in other institutions as mediating factors
1 2 3 4
unempl. spending (lagged) 0.083* 0.085* 0.107** 0.101**
[2.44] [2.25] [2.88] [2.73]
labor market policies spending (lagged) -0.098** -0.107** -0.077* -0.083*
[2.97] [2.93] [2.14] [2.31]
unemployment (lagged) 0.091* 0.094* 49 74
[2.26] [2.09] [1.13] [1.67]
inflation -2 -13 -16 -2
[1.05] [0.59] [0.72] [0.91]
infl. squared 1 0 0 1
[0.50] [0.04] [0.07] [0.15]
population (lagged) -3.074** -2.835** -3.165** -3.070**
[4.17] [3.48] [4.01] [3.81]
GDP (lagged) 0.875** 0.868** 0.849** 0.852**
[6.11] [5.33] [5.28] [5.05]
Trust in national Parliament (% pop) 0.289** 163
[3.19] [0.72]
Trust in national Government (% pop) 0.265** 62
[3.03] [0.34]
Trust in the EU (% pop) 0.473** 0.323*
[3.28] [2.05]
Constant 41.547** 37.747** 43.317** 41.658**
[3.72] [3.08] [3.64] [3.46]
Observations 71 59 59 59
Number of id 12 12 12 12
R-squared 68 7 72 75
F-test 12641 8871 12197 16314
p-value 29 42 31 21
Notes: Dependent variable is percentage of population expressing trust in the ECB. GLS fixed effects estimation. 
Year effects are included but not reported. ‘+’, ‘*’, ‘**’ denote significant at the 10, 5, or 1 percent levels, 
respectively. 32
Table 7: Long-term GDP growth
1 2 3 4 5 6
GDP growth -0.687* -411 156 -141
[2.13] [1.20] [0.50] [0.36]
GDP growth 5 years 189 12
[0.89] [0.58]
GDP growth 10 years 0.321* 0.347** 171 204
[2.50] [3.07] [1.55] [1.53]
GDP growth 20 years 14 -62
[0.95] [0.37]
population (lagged) -718 23 -612 -2.289* -2.738** -1787
[0.60] [0.33] [0.70] [2.53] [3.15] [1.44]
GDP (lagged) 0.732** 0.890** 0.701*
[3.87] [4.66] [2.32]
Constant 12078 -3337 10552 30.433* 36.230** 22576
[0.61] [0.29] [0.74] [2.26] [2.72] [1.16]
Observations 72 72 72 72 72 72
Number of id 12 12 12 12 12 12
R-squared 42 32 22 47 45 48
Notes: Dependent variable is percentage of population expressing trust in the ECB. GLS fixed effects estimation. 
Year effects are included but not reported. ‘+’, ‘*’, ‘**’ denote significant at the 10, 5, or 1 percent levels, 
respectively. 33
Table 8: Having profound knowledge on the EU
1 3 4 2 5 6
inflation -32 -5 -33 -28 -0.034+ -0.031+
[1.54] [1.05] [1.57] [1.50] [1.88] [1.69]
infl. squared 3 4 3 3 4 4
[0.93] [0.46] [0.96] [0.92] [1.33] [1.20]
population (lagged) -2.736** -2.599** -2.753** -3.602** -3.407** -3.271**
[3.22] [2.97] [3.21] [4.48] [4.39] [3.99]
GDP (lagged) 0.828** 0.829** 0.809** 0.984** 0.971** 0.933**
[4.71] [4.66] [4.41] [6.00] [6.17] [5.66]
unempl. spending (lagged) 0.084* 0.159** 0.085*
[2.17] [3.17] [2.24]
labor market policies spending (lagged) -0.115** -0.105** -71
[3.08] [2.91] [1.54]
unemployment (lagged) 68 65 78
[1.42] [1.43] [1.64]
know EU, % pop 55 153 -3043 122 -103 -627
[1.26] [0.19] [0.35] [0.29] [0.25] [0.99]
inflation*know EU 151
[0.25]
inflation squared*know EU 9
[0.06]
active labor market policies*know EU -824
[1.56]




Constant 36.806** 34.602* 37.292** 49.206** 46.175** 44.335**
[2.88] [2.62] [2.88] [4.04] [3.92] [3.57]
Observations 72 72 72 72 72 72
Number of id 12 12 12 12 12 12
R-squared 5 51 5 63 67 65
Notes: Dependent variable is percentage of population expressing trust in the ECB. GLS fixed effects estimation. 
Year effects are included but not reported. ‘+’, ‘*’, ‘**’ denote significant at the 10, 5, or 1 percent levels, 
respectively. 34
Table 9: Expectations on the economy and personal household
1 2 3 4 5
unempl. spending (lagged) 0.083* 0.082* 0.077* 0.088* 0.089*
[2.18] [2.19] [2.16] [2.36] [2.34]
labor market policies spending (lagged) -0.117** -0.105** -0.115** -0.118** -0.116**
[3.20] [2.91] [3.36] [3.30] [3.22]
unemployment (lagged) 72 66 0.093* 0.083+ 7
[1.63] [1.53] [2.21] [1.90] [1.59]
Inflation -29 -28 -27 -29 -0.033+
[1.56] [1.60] [1.60] [1.63] [1.80]
Inflation squared 3 4 4 4 4
[1.01] [1.27] [1.32] [1.22] [1.31]
population (lagged) -3.610** -3.233** -3.313** -3.350** -3.347**
[4.54] [4.05] [4.41] [4.23] [4.14]
GDP (lagged) 0.998** 0.924** 0.914** 0.925** 0.949**
[6.43] [5.94] [6.17] [5.89] [6.02]
Expected: Bad state of the economy -0.101+
[1.94]
Expected: Bad household finances -0.255**
[2.82]
Expected: Bad personal job situation -0.304+
[1.80]
Expected: Bad general employment situation -65
[1.42]
Constant 49.188** 43.824** 45.181** 45.673** 45.426**
[4.07] [3.63] [3.97] [3.82] [3.71]
Observations 72 72 72 72 72
Number of id 12 12 12 12 12
R-squared 63 66 68 65 65
Notes: Dependent variable is percentage of population expressing trust in the ECB. GLS fixed effects estimation. 
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